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FEDERAL ANTISECRECY LEGISLATION: A MODEL 
ACT TO SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC FROM COURT-
SANCTIONED HIDDEN HAZARDS 
Andrew D. Miller* 
It is perfectly appropriate for the parties to a lawsuit to insist that 
everything that's happened in the lawsuit will be kept confidential if 
that helps encourage settlement. 
Peter Bleakly, Xerox Corporation lawyerl 
Consumers suffer serious injury and death from hazards that are 
concealed by confidential settlements. 
Dianne Jay Weaver, Board of Governors, Association of 
Trial Lawyers of America2 
They paid my clients a ton of money for me to shut up. 
Allan Kanner, Zomax Victims' lawyer3 
• Solicitations Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. I would like to thank my loving and supportive fiancee Wendy Kaplan for all of her 
help. 
1 Open Court Records to Protect Public, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1989, at 6A. 
2 Dianne Jay Weaver, Secrets That Can Kill Have No Place In Our Courts, 19 PRODUCTS 
SAFETY LIABILITY REP., 701, 701 (1991). The prepared statement of Devra Davis, Ph.D., 
before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Committee on the Judiciary, 
U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (May 17, 1990), highlighted the effect of court-
sanctioned secret settlements. In 1983, Ms. Davis suffered a potentially fatal anaphylactic 
reaction to the drug Zomax. At some point after her adverse reaction to the drug, Ms. Davis 
learned that as many as three years ago others had suffered similar reactions to Zomax, and 
that some of these individuals had died. The drug's manufacturer successfully concealed 
information regarding Zomax's fatal complications through court-sanctioned settlement agree-
ments.Id. 
a Open Court Records to Protect Public, supra note 1, at 6A. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of protective orders, confidentiality or "secrecy" 
agreements, and sealed court files has brought charges that a system 
of private justice has taken over our public court system, and left in 
its wake the potentially deadly reality of environmental hazards, 
medical malpractice, and defective products.4 Because most civil 
cases settle before trial, the possibility exists that defense counsel 
will attempt to suppress discovery information and settlement terms 
by offering plaintiffs large cash payments in exchange for confidential 
settlements. 5 This cash-for-silence exchange, ensuring the confiden-
tiality of the terms of the agreement and the information exchanged 
in discovery, is called a "secrecy agreement."6 
The use of secrecy agreements in civil cases has steadily risen 
since the mid-1970's, while demands for court issued protective or-
ders are now routine practice among defense attorneys in products 
liability cases. 7 The threat to public health and safety that secrecy 
agreements and protective orders pose, is elevated by the systemic 
pressure placed on judges to promote settlement, expedite cases, 
and sanction agreements reached between parties. 8 
Since the 1988 Washington Post series "Public Courts, Private 
Justice," the media have given the issue of secret settlements wide-
spread attention. 9 As a result of this national exposure, states have 
responded by developing antisecrecy laws and court rules to reduce 
the number of secret agreements, and court orders that limit public 
access to court record information pertinent to the public health and 
safety. 10 Recently four states have passed antisecrecy legisla-
4 See Herb Jaffe, Public Good vs. Sealed Evidence, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, Sept. 2, 1990, 
§ 3, at 1; see generally, Elsa Walsh & Benjamin Weiser, Public Courts, Private Justice: Court 
Secrecy Masks Safety Issues, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,1988, at A1, A22. 
5 See Joseph F. Sullivan, In Lawsuits, How Much Should the Courts Keep Secret?, 
N.Y.TIMES., Mar. 3, 1991, § 4, at 6. About 97% of all civil suits nationally are settled. Id. 
(statistic from Sanford N. Jaffe, Director ofthe Center for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution 
at Rutgers University). 
6 See Tripp Baltz, ShhhhAjonjidentiality in the Courts, CHI. LAW., Jan. 1991, at 1; FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
7 See Walsh & Weiser supra note 4, at A22; Steve McGonigle, Secret Lawsuits Shelter 
Wealthy, Influential, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 22,1987, at 1A. In Dallas County alone, 
between 1980 and 1987, judges issued 200 sealing orders in cases not involving child-related 
issues where sealing orders are commonly used to protect the minors involved. Id. 
B See Walsh & Weiser, supra note 4, at A22. 
9 See id. 
10 See Amy Dockser Marcus, Firms' Secrets Are Increasingly Bared by Courts, WALL. ST. 
J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 1, § B. 
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tion,l1 while four other states have adopted antisecrecy court 
rules. 12 
The success of the antisecrecy drive is a source of current contro-
versy. Opponents of the movement claim that antisecrecy bills failed 
in eighteen states in 1991 alone. 13 A national debate has developed 
over confidentiality in the courts: a debate that pits the public's right 
to know what transpires in the public court system squarely against 
the individual's right to privacy. 14 As attorneys battle over the policy 
issues involved and the fundamental questions raised about the pur-
pose and role of the American court system, public attention has 
turned to the United States Congress, where the fate of antisecrecy 
legislation lies. 15 
From an environmental standpoint, the limiting of access to dis-
covery evidence and settlement information poses a risk to public 
health and safety.16 Court-sanctioned secret settlements and protec-
tive orders have resulted in non-disclosure of information as impor-
tant to public health as the release of toxins into ground water and 
the air by corporations. 17 Not only is the public denied access to 
information pertaining to the destruction of critical environments 
because of court sanctioned secret settlements and protective orders, 
but secret agreements also hinder the ability of agencies to take 
legal action against the source of such hazards. 18 
This Comment proposes that the present standard of review for 
the issuance of protective orders19 is ineffective, and that Congress 
11 As of October 18, 1991, four states had enacted antisecrecy legislation. See FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-12.2 (1989); O~. REV. STAT. 
§ 30.42 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-420.01 (West Supp. 1990). 
12 See DEL. CT. CIV. P. R. 9(bb) (1990); N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 216.1 
(1990); SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUP. CT. R., Dlv. II, Rule 6.9 (1990); TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 
76a (West Supp. 1991). 
13 See MA. LAW. WKLY., Lawmakers Say 'Nyet' To 'Court Glasnost', May 27, 1991, at 3. 
14 See Baltz, supra note 6, at l. 
15 See generally Senate Panel Urged To Curb Closure Of Civil Case Records To Protect 
Public, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 97, at A-14 (May 18, 1990). [hereinafter 
Senate Panel]. 
16 See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 6. 
17 See Martin H. Freeman & Robert K. Jenner, Just Say No; Resisting Protective Orders, 
TRIAL, 66, 70 & n.26, 71 (citing Del Monte V. Xerox Corp. No. 14121186 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
Monroe County Aug. 15, 1989». In the Del Monte settlement, the Xerox Corporation ex-
changed a $4.75-million offer for a confidentiality stipulation that bound two families, suing 
on behalf of their children who had contracted cancer, not to disclose information that Xerox 
had released toxic chemicals into local groundwater and into the air. [d. 
18 See Senate Panel, supra note 15, at A-14. 
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). The provision states that 
upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for 
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending ... may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
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must formulate an antisecrecy law that has as its primary purpose 
the protection of public health and safety. Section II of this Comment 
discusses the arguments for and against antisecrecy legislation in 
general. Section III examines two major antisecrecy state statutes: 
Rule 76a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding the sealing 
of court records,20 and Section 69.081, the Florida Sunshine in Liti-
gation Act, which prohibits concealment of a public hazard in a court 
order, judgment, agreement or contract. 21 Section IV of this Com-
ment establishes the goals and purposes of federal antisecrecy leg-
islation. Finally, Sections V and VI conclude by proposing and ex-
plaining a federal antisecrecy statute that would provide access to 
information pertinent to public health and safety and declare void 
any settlement or contract that has the effect of concealing a public 
hazard. The proposed statute would safeguard both the legitimate 
privacy rights of individuals and the interests of business. 
II. ANTISECRECY LEGISLATION: How THEY WORK, AND Do 
THEY WORK? 
A. How Confidentiality Orders Work 
At both the federal and state level there are three ways to assure 
that discovery documents and settlement terms remain confidential. 
First, defendants may request a protective order during the discov-
ery phase of litigation. Such an order would allow the release of 
internal documents on the condition that their contents remain con-
fidential. 22 The scope of a protective order may cover the release of 
only one document, or, if an "umbrella" order is issued, may include 
many documents.23 Umbrella orders, classifying all exchanged doc-
umentation as confidential, eliminate the burdensome court task of 
Id. 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) 
that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specific 
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the 
discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the 
party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the 
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters . . . (7) that a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed 
or be disclosed only in a designated way. . . . 
20 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a (West Supp. 1991). 
21 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 1990). 
22 See Elsa Walsh & Benjamin Weiser, Early Warning Signals on Safety Often Ignored in 
Rush to Secrecy, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1988, at AI. 
23 See Freeman & Jenner, supra note 17, at 67-68. 
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sifting through reams of discovery material for confidential content. 24 
A judge may issue a protective order, of any scope, over the objec-
tion of opposing counsel. 25 
Second, both parties to a settlement may agree privately on the 
confidential nature of the settlement and ask the judge to dismiss 
the lawsuit. 26 Settlement agreements contingent on confidentiality 
stipulations are attractive to all involved. Confidentiality stipulations 
allow the plaintiff's attorney to obtain a larger settlement in ex-
change for the agreement, the defense attorney to conceal effectively 
the client's faults, and judges to clear dockets by avoiding lengthy 
trials. 27 In most cases, plaintiffs cannot afford to wait for a verdict 
and view the settlement offer as a risk-free alternative. 28 
Finally, the parties may request that the court seal the entire 
lawsuit file, removing all aspects of the suit, from original filings to 
settlement terms, from public access.29 A party seeking to seal the 
entire court record in a case must meet procedural and substantive 
common law requirements.3o Suits filed under a sealing order receive 
the label Sealed v. Sealed, completely protecting the identity of the 
parties and providing only the name of the approving judge. 31 Sealing 
orders may be so inclusive as to contain stipUlations to bar access to 
information otherwise available under the Freedom of Information 
Act.32 
B. The Arguments Against Antisecrecy Legislation 
The opponents of open court records believe that the current 
system of judicial discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 26(c) works, and that antisecrecy legislation is an unneces-
sary interference with the judicial role of establishing the balance 
between the litigant's privacy rights and the public's common law 
24 Id. 
25 See Walsh & Weiser, supra note 22, at AI. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. Typically settlements contain no admission of fault. Id. 
28 See Alan Abrahamson, New Ruling Lifts Veil of Secrecy in Civil Cases, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 9, 1990, at 1, Metro, part B. 
29 See Walsh & Weiser, supra note 22, at AI. 
30 Ernest E. Figari, Jr. et aI., Annual Survey of Texas Law: Civil Procedure, 45 Sw. L.J. 
73,84 & n. 107; see, e.g., In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470,476 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(public must be given opportunity to present views against sealing); Newman v. Graddick, 
696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983) (as procedural requirement, movant must give "proper 
notice" to public). I d. 
31 See Walsh & Weiser, supra note 4, at 22. 
32 See Jaffe, supra note 4, § 3, at 1. 
376 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:371 
right of access to court records. 33 Under FRCP 26(c), upon a showing 
of good cause by a movant, a judge may issue a protective order to 
safeguard a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense.34 Working under the rule, judges have 
discretion to refuse protective orders where secrecy would compro-
mise public health and safety.35 Opponents claim that secrecy agree-
ments are beneficial because they keep defendant's private affairs 
confidential, bring suits to their fruition more quickly, and compen-
sate plaintiffs in a risk-free and efficient manner.36 Opponents of 
antisecrecy legislation also believe that confidentiality orders are 
necessary to protect the public from inaccurate safety and health 
information that otherwise would become public upon settlement. 37 
Opponents of antisecrecy legislation contend that an avalanche of 
additional suits will result from any legislation that prevents the 
sealing of settlements from public access.38 If litigants are not firmly 
assured that a settlement will put an end to a suit, then incentive 
to settle is lost, and the result is an increase in litigation. 39 This 
influx of litigation, opponents argue, will increase congestion in the 
already overburdened court system.40 Moreover, widespread publi-
cation of settlements will hinder the ability of a company, or other 
defendant, with multiple lawsuits pending to obtain an impartial jury 
in subsequent litigation. 41 
Openness legislation, its opponents argue, will encourage frivolous 
lawsuits. 42 Business interests believe an influx of frivolous litigation 
will directly threaten the protection of trade secrets, presently safe-
guarded through protective orders issued under FRCP 26(c).43 With 
a decrease in the issuance of protective orders, many in the business 
33 See Senate Panel, supra note 15, at A-14; Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 
U.S. 589, 597 (1978). "The courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy 
public records and documents, including judicial records and documents."ld. 
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
35 See Baltz, supra note 6, at 1. 
36 See Dolores Ziegler, Letting 'Sunshine' in; California Joins Trend to Strip Secrecy from 
Court Files, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 29, 1990, at 1. 
37 See Senate Panel, supra note 15, at A-14. Testimony of Arthur R. Miller, Harvard 
University Law Professor, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Admin-
istrative Practice, May 17, 1990. ld. 
38 See Baltz, supra note 6, at 1; Abrahamson, supra note 28, at 1, Metro, part B. 
39 See Texas High Court Cuts into Secrecy in Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1990, at 
17. 
40 See Senate Panel, supra note 15, at A-14. 
41 See Abrahamson, supra note 28, at 1, Metro, part B. 
42 See Marcus, supra note 10, at 1, § B. 
43 See id; see also note 19 and accompanying text. 
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community fear that competitors will initiate suits solely to unearth 
business secrets,44 and that "special interest" groups will use anti-
secrecy legislation to further their efforts to obtain information for 
future, related trials. 45 
The privacy right of the litigant is the major concern of antisecrecy 
legislation opponents. 46 The privacy argument stems from the belief 
that public access to the confidential information that a defendant 
reveals to defend itself is not a right established simply because 
another party has elected to sue the defendant. 47 Opponents to open 
court records argue that the role of the American civil justice system 
is not to act as a means of disseminating information, but is to resolve 
disputes efficiently and fairly.48 Defense attorneys, the most vocal 
opponent to antisecrecy legislation, contend that the public may have 
a right of access to non-confidential court records, but that pre-trial 
discovery is, and should remain, private. 49 
Defense attorneys criticize the plaintiffs' attorneys fervent sup-
port of the antisecrecy movement as a self-interested attempt to 
benefit commercially their industry. 50 Many defense attorneys be-
lieve that by grandstanding public settlements for media coverage, 
plaintiffs' attorneys are selfishly trying to gain public exposure that 
will lead to future clients. 51 Opponents of the movement point to 
abuses already prevalent in the discovery process, for example the 
sale of discovery documents to other plaintiff's attorneys for future 
litigation, as indicia of the plaintiffs' bar's motivation for support of 
anti secrecy measures. 52 
Finally, opponents of antisecrecy legislation suggest that the pres-
ent system of issuing protective orders does not block the plaintiffs' 
44 See Baltz, supra note 6, at 1. If trade secrets become revealed as a result of antisecrecy 
legislation, then "industrial espionage will be put out of business." Id. 
45 See Abrahamson, supra note 28, at 1, Metro, part B. 
46 See Diane Burch, Record-Sealing Plan Already Drawing Fire, TEX. LAW., Feb. 26,1990, 
at 4. 
47 See Baltz, supra note 6, at 1. Id. 
48 See Andrew Blum, Anti Secrecy Drive Spreads in the States, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 14, 1991, 
at 3,28. 
49 See Barry Siegel, Dilemmas of Settling in Secret; Companies Offer Hefty Sums in 
Exchange for Keeping the Details of Public-Hazard Lawsuits Quiet. Plaintiffs Must Choose 
their own Interest or the Public Good, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at 1. Siegel argues that not 
all lawsuits are meritorious and that a company's private files should not immediately be 
subject to disclosure at commencement of a suit when the action may be little more than a 
"fishing expedition" on the part of plaintiff's attorney. Id. 
50 See id at 1. 
51Id. 
52 See Terry O'Reilly, Put an End to Secret Settlements, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1990, at 128. 
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attorneys from obtaining information and creating public awareness 
of hazardous products. 53 Defense attorneys claim that protective 
orders are already difficult to obtain,54 and forecast the ineffective-
ness of antisecrecy legislation by predicting that the judge faced 
with a crowded docket will not risk losing a settlement over the 
issue of confidentiality. 55 
C. Arguments for Antisecrecy Legislation 
Most states have no statute or court rule that either establishes a 
uniform method for issuing protective or sealing orders, or mandates 
guidelines for judges to follow in dismissing a lawsuit in the wake of 
a confidential settlement. 56 On the federal level, FRCP 26(c) provides 
that a judge consider solely the privacy interests of the litigants in 
determining "good cause" for the issuance of a protective order. 57 
The results of this "good cause" analysis are an almost casual dis-
regard by some judges for Rule 26(c) because of their overwhelming 
case load, and the lack of a disinterested party to present the public 
interest viewpoint in the decision-making process. 58 Proponents of 
antisecrecy legislation are of the opinion that this "good cause" stan-
dard is inadequate to safeguard the public from hidden hazards, and 
is easily manipulated by business interests to conceal health and 
safety information. 59 
53 See Ziegler, supra note 36, at 1. 
54 See Baltz, supra note 6, at 1. 
55 See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 28, at 1, Metro, part B. 
56 See Ziegler, supra note 36, at 1. 
57 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c); Lloyd Doggett & Michael Mucchetti, Public Access to Public 
Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643, 657 (1991). 
58 See Baltz, supra note 6, at 1; Ziegler, supra note 36, at 1. The media challenges only 2% 
of sealing order or gag order cases (usually for high-profile, criminal cases). This leaves 98% 
of all cases involving confidentiality orders of any sort uncontested. Ziegler, supra note 36, at 
1. According to Roderic Duncan, an Almeda County Superior Court judge, "[i]n those cases 
(the remaining 98%), most judges do not stop to question whether to approve confidentiality 
agreements." Id. Justice Lloyd Doggett of the Texas Supreme Court feels that judges have 
not taken to heart the import of sealing agreements. According to Doggett, "[m]any judges 
have shirked their responsibilities." Ronald J. Ostrow, Secrecy Accords in Product Liability 
Lawsuits Debated, L.A. TrMEs, Apr. 26, 1990, at 16, part A. 
59 See Senate Panel, supra note 15, at A-14; ct. Daniel Wise, Abrams Advocates Government 
Access to Court-Sealed Files, N. Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1991, at 1. New York State Attorney General 
Robert Abrams, in advocating antisecrecy legislation for New York, said that this type of 
legislation is needed because of a "disturbing trend toward secrecy agreements." Id. He 
asserted that "potentially life-saving information about unsafe products or toxic exposure may 
be locked away in sealed court files or concealed by private agreements, forcing the govern-
ment and the public to wait for years to find out about possible health hazards." Id. 
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Proponents of antisecrecy legislation believe that secrecy agree-
ments have increased at an alarming rate60 because the overbur-
dened court system is not checked for abuses, and because the 
discretion to seal court records and dismiss suits after confidential 
settlements is in the hands of a busy judge.61 Secrecy agreements, 
these proponents point out, were originally intended to safeguard 
trade secrets and highly personal information.62 Proponents argue 
that judges now routinely sign protective orders for a wide variety 
of documents if all the parties have agreed to the order. 63 
Central to the openness movement is the belief that the public has 
a "right to know" what transpires in the publicly funded court sys-
tem. 64 "Right-to-know" supporters contend that when private liti-
gants use publicly funded courts to resolve their disputes, these 
suits become public business, and the public has a basic right to 
know how the parties are resolving them. 65 Right-to-know theorists 
hold that the public should have access to information about courts 
and their proceedings on the basis of the public's First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech66 and the common law grant of access to 
court records. 67 
Proponents of the "openness movement" believe antisecrecy leg-
islation will not discourage settlements or significantly increase liti-
gation. 68 They contend that if parties act in good faith and with the 
knowledge that judges will not approve settlement agreements that 
run counter to public health and safety interests, then large money 
settlements that conceal public hazards will disappear, thus leaving 
the cases that would naturally settle to continue to do SO.69 These 
60 See Andrew Blum, A Public Gathering Discusses Trial Secrecy, NAT'L L.J., May 7,1990, 
at 14. A 1988 Washington Post investigative report "Public Courts, Private Justice," found 
200 lawsuits sealed in 1988 in Washington D.C., along with hundreds of confidentiality orders. 
See id. The Dallas Morning News uncovered 282 sealed cases in Dallas County in 1987. See 
id. The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin unearthed over 500 cases sealed in Cook County Circuit 
Court in the last decade despite an Illinois law allowing for public access to court records. Id. 
6! See Ostrow, supra note 58, at 16, part A. 
62 See Weaver, supra note 2, at 701; FED. R. Cry. P. 26(c); supra note 19 and accompanying 
text. 
63 See Jaffe, supra note 4, at § 3, 1; Ziegler, supra note 36, at 1. 
64 See Ziegler, supra note 36, at 1. 
65 See Prepared Statement of Justice Lloyd Doggett, Supreme Court of Texas, before the 
Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. 
Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (May 17, 1990); Weaver, supra note 2, at 701. 
66 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2. 
67 See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). Baltz, supra 
note 6, at 1. 
68 See Weaver, supra note 2, at 701. 
69 Id. 
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proponents state that if antisecrecy legislation passes, there will be 
a small group of cases that may not settle without a confidentiality 
agreement, but that these are exactly the type of cases at which the 
legislation is aimed, namely "hush money" exchanges for the con-
cealment of public hazards. 70 Thus, proponents of antisecrecy legis-
lation believe that even if such legislation produces more litigation, 
this result is in the public's best interest. 
In addition, proponents argue that antisecrecy legislation will also 
alleviate an ethical dilemma confronting plaintiffs' attorneys. An 
attorney has an ethical duty to serve his or her client's best interest 
and legally fulfill his or her client's objectives. 71 If a client, for 
whatever reason, is not concerned with the effect that a confidential 
settlement may have on the health and safety of the general public, 
then the client's attorney is obligated to defer to the client's pref-
erence for a high settlement in exchange for a secrecy agreement. 72 
The terms of the settlement may bar any involved party from dis-
cussing any aspect of the case with any third party.73 Thus, if anti-
secrecy legislation prevents judges from sealing settlement records 
that contain information pertinent to public health and safety, plain-
tiffs' attorneys will be confronted with such ethical dilemmas in fewer 
instances. 74 
Proponents of antisecrecy legislation, most notably plaintiffs' at-
torneys, refute defense attorneys' claims of the evils of information-
sharing and the plaintiffs' bar's self-interested impetus behind their 
support of the openness movement. Plaintiffs' attorneys argue, shar-
ing information promotes efficiency and saves court time and client 
money.75 The probability that one attorney will share information 
about a specific case with another attorney is not sufficient "good 
cause" to justify a protective order under FRCP 26(c).76 United 
States District Court Judge H. Lee Sorkin, famous for his tough 
stance against manufacturer secrecy in the cigarette industry, be-
lieves that plaintiffs begin suits at a disadvantage in having to invest 
70 Marcus, supra note 10, at 1, sec. B. 
71 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1990). "A lawyer shall not 
intentionally: Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available 
means ... " Id. at (A)(I). 
72 See Siegel, supra note 49, at 1. 
73 See Jaffe, supra note 4, § 3, at 1. 
74Id. 
76 See Larry E. Coben, Protective Orders; Manufacturers Hide Behind Them, TRIAL, Aug. 
1986, at 34. 
76 See Patterson v. Ford Motor Co" 85 F.R.D. 152, 15~ (D. Tex. 1980). 
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considerable time and money into the discovery process, and that 
requiring each plaintiff to duplicate the steps of a lengthy discovery 
wastes the court's and the plaintiffs' resources. 77 Plaintiffs' lawyers 
also summarily dismiss the charge that the Plaintiffs' bar support of 
openness legislation is a self-interested attempt to drum up business 
by pointing to the fact that people rarely remember an attorney's 
name from a previous case. 78 
III. TEXAS' RULE 76A AND FLORIDA'S SUNSHINE IN 
LITIGATION ACT 
Two distinct approaches to antisecrecy legislation have emerged 
from the myriad of state initiatives. Texas' Rule of Civil Procedure 
76a (Rule 76a) creates a "presumption of openness" affirming public 
access to all court records. 79 This "presumption of openness" is only 
overcome if a party seeking to seal court records, demonstrates, 
after a public hearing, a specific, serious and substantial privacy 
interest in sealing the record in question.80 The moving party's pri-
vacy interest must outweigh any adverse effect on public health and 
safety, and there must exist no less restrictive means than sealing 
the document to protect that interest. 81 
The Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act is the type of anti secrecy 
legislation most commonly proposed in other states.82 In contrast to 
the hearing procedure of Rule 76a, the Florida statute categorically 
forbids courts from entering any order that has the eff~ct of con-
cealing a public hazard or information pertaining to a hazard.83 The 
statute further empowers the court to void contracts or agreements 
designed to conceal public hazards, and requires disclosure of any 
information brought to the court's attention which may involve po-
tential public hazards.84 
77 Jaffe, supra note 4, at § 3, 1. 
78 See O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 128. 
79 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(1) (West Supp. 1991). 
f'lJId. 
81Id. 
82 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 1991). Legislation similar or identical to the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act was proposed in California, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania. See Summary of Developments on Secrecy Issue, American Trial Lawyers 
Association, Oct. 18, 1991. In Michigan, a court rule incorporating the "public hazard" concept 
was also proposed. Id. 
83 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (3) (West Supp. 1991). 
84 Id. at 4. 
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A. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a: "Justice-not just us''85 
After much debate and compromise, the Texas Supreme Court, 
by a five-to-four vote, adopted Rule 76a.86 A response to the growing 
abuse of secrecy agreements,87 Rule 76a chipped away at the tradi-
tional shape of the American civil suit by creating a "presumption 
of openness" for all civil court records.88 In essence, Rule 76a is a 
restructuring of the process in which courts issue protective, or 
sealing orders. 89 
1. The Rule 76a Balancing Test 
Following the common law tradition,90 Rule 76a mandates that any 
civil suit filed in the state of Texas proceed with the presumption 
that all "court records" involved in the suit are open to the pUblic. 91 
Under Rule 76a, a movant must do more than simply establish the 
"good cause" required under FRCP 26(c) to receive a protective or 
sealing order to shelter the movant from the risk of possible "an-
noyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense."92 The Texas approach differs from the approach of those 
federal courts that do not weigh the public interest in their "good 
cause"/protective order decision-making process. 93 
Under the Rule 76a balancing test, the movant must demonstrate, 
85 See Blum, supra note 60, at 14. (Justice Lloyd Doggett's slogan for future of public 
involvement in decision to seal court records). 
86 See Lloyd Doggett, Keeping Court Records in the Open; Texas Suprerru3 Court Adopts 
New Rule, TRIAL, July, 1990, at 62, 62. The Texas Supreme Court was inundated with 
warnings from the Product Liability Advisory Council, the Texas Association of Defense 
Counsel, and the American Tort Reform Association about the ill·advised choice the Court 
was making in the adoption of this rule and the dire economic consequences that would result. 
[d. 
ffl See, Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 645. In Dallas County, in non-child-related 
cases between 1980 and 1987, judges entered 200 sealing orders covering cases involving 
environmental hazards, medical malpractice, and defective products. [d. 
88 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(I)(a)(I) (West Supp. 1991). 
89 See Clara Tuma, Court Passes Sweeping New Rules on Sealed Records; Hightower Casts 
Deciding Vote on Access to Discovery Docurru3nts, TEX. LAW., Apr. 23, 1990, at 4. 
00 See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); see also supra 
note 26 and accompanying text. 
91 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(1) (West Supp. 1991). This section provides that court 
records, as defined in this rule, are presumed to be open to the general public. [d. 
92 See Doggett, supra note 86, at 63; supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
93 [d. 
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by a preponderance of the evidence, a specific, serious and substan-
tial interest that clearly outweighs the presumption of openness that 
attaches to all civil suit court records. 94 This balancing test assumes 
that a judge will take the time95 to weigh the privacy interest of the 
movant against both the strong presumption of openness and the 
possible adverse effects that sealing may have on public health and 
safety.96 In other words, Rule 76a's balancing test retains the judicial 
discretion inherent in the "good cause" standard of FRCP 26c, yet 
establishes guidelines that the court must follow to protect the public 
interest.97 The rule does not assure public access to every court file, 
but theoretically does guarantee that the public safety and welfare 
are given more than a passing consideration. 98 
2. Definition of "Court Records" 
In an effort to prevent attorneys from creatively maneuvering 
their case documentation beyond Rule 76a's reach, the rule's authors 
drafted the term "court records" to include most documents involved 
in a civil suit.99 Rule 76a's "court records" definition is expansive. It 
even includes settlement agreements that, although not filed of rec-
ord, contain provisions restricting the disclosure of information that 
94 TEX. R. elV. P. ANN. r. 76a(1) (West Supp.1991). The section provides that 
Id. 
[c]ourt records may not be removed from court files except as permitted by statute 
or rule. No court order or opinion issued in the adjudication of a case may be sealed. 
Other court records, as defined in this rule, are presumed to be open to the general 
public and may be sealed only upon a showing of all of the following: 
(a) a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs: 
(1) this presumption of openness; 
(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon general public health 
or safety; 
(b) no less restrictive means than sealing records will adequately and effectively 
protect the specific interest asserted. 
96 See Mark Ballard, Courts Delang Much-Feared Rule: In Keeping Records Secret, It's 
Business as Usual, TEX. LAW., Dec. 3, 1990, at 1. In only one of nine secrecy hearings 
conducted as of Dember 3, 1990, did a judge take longer then five minutea to pass on the 
secrecy request. Id. Even if the judiciary takes the balancing test procedure to heart, the 
terms of the balancing test may be so vague that they lend themselves to vastly differing 
judicial interpretations. See Herring, infra note 108, at 24. 
96 See Doggett, supra note 86, at 63. 
97 TEX. R. elV. P. ANN. r. 76a(1) (West Supp.1991); see supra note 94 and accompanying 
text. 
98 See TEX. R. elV. P. ANN. r. 76a(1) (West Supp. 1991). 
99 See, Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 658. 
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may have an adverse effect upon public health or safety or concern 
the administration or operation of government.1oo This provision 
broadens the scope of documentation within the rules' coverage in 
an attempt to prevent parties from eluding Rule 76a by conditioning 
settlement on private nondisclosure or document destruction agree-
ments. 101 
Excluded from Rule 76a's balancing test are discovery documents 
exchanged in cases initiated to protect bona fide trade secrets102 and 
intangible property rights. loa Like FRCP 26(c),104 Rule 76a explicitly 
provides that courts must consider trade secrets as a substantial 
privacy interest under the balancing test analysis. 105 To discourage 
the use of discovery as a substitute for research and innovation, 106 
Rule 76a's protections for trade secrets include requirements that 
the trade secret itself must be discoverable before the court applies 
the balancing test, that an opportunity for in camera inspection of 
the documentation must exist and, in the event the court denies a 
sealing or protective order for a trade secret, that the secret itself 
is not disclosed, but the court will reveal the hazardous effects of 
the product or procedure in question. 107 
The most controversial provision of Rule 76a defines court records 
to include pretrial discovery documents. 108 Any discovery, excluding 
100 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(2)(a)-{b) (West Supp. 1991). The section provides that 
[flor purposes of this rule, court records means: 
Id. 
(a) all documents of any nature filed in connection with any matter before any civil 
court, except: 
(1) documents filed with a court in camera, solely for the purpose of obtaining a 
ruling on the discoverability of such documents; 
(2) documents in court files to which access is otherwise restricted by law; 
(3) documents filed in an action originally arising under the Family Code. 
(b) settlement agreements, not filed of record, excluding all references to monetary 
considerations, that seek to restrict disclosure of information concerning matters that 
have a probable adverse effect upon general public health or safety, or the adminis-
tration of public office, or the operation of government; .... 
101 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 659. 
102 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 776 (5th ed. 1983). A trade secret is a "formula, pattern, 
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives one 
opportunity to obtain advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." Id. 
103 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991). 
104 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(7). Protective orders may be authorized for "a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development or commercial information .... " Id. 
105 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991). 
100 See Baltz, supra note 6, at l. 
107 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 675. 
lOB See Chuck Herring, Sealing Court Records, Unanswered Questions and Unsolved Prob-
lems, TEX. LAW., May 21, 1990, at 24; Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. r. 76a(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991). 
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correspondence, exchanged or examined between counsel that may 
adversely effect public health or safety is subject to the balancing 
test. 109 Defense attorneys argue that Rule 76a's inclusion of pretrial 
discovery within the definition of "court records" that are open to 
the public is a departure from established American law. 110 In Seattle 
Times v. Rhinehart,111 the Supreme Court of the United States 
concluded that under the common law, traditional discovery docu-
mentation, including unfiled depositions and interrogatories, was not 
open to the public as a matter of right. 112 Thus, defense attorneys 
feel justified in arguing that pretrial discovery materials, such as 
unfiled depositions and interrogatories, are inherently private, 113 and 
should not be subject to the Rule's balancing test. The discovery 
provisions of Rule 76a requiring retention of unfiled documents also 
have raised questions about attorneys' obligations to keep records, 
the length of time they must keep records, their responsibilities for 
closed files, and the extent of public access attorneys must allow to 
documents. 114 
In defense of Rule 76a's inclusion of pretrial discovery within its 
"court records" definition, Justice Lloyd Doggett, the architect of 
Rule 76a, points to Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,115 which he believes 
resolves the ambiguities of Rhinehart. 116 In Anderson, the Supreme 
Court held that within FRCP 26(c)'s "good cause" framework, pro-
tective discovery orders are subject to First Amendment evalua-
tion.ll7 Doggett believes that Rule 76a fits neatly under the Ander-
son view that the court must consider the First Amendment right 
to access in its determination of whether good cause exists under 
the rules for the issuance of a protective order. 118 Under Rule 76a, 
only unfiled pretrial discovery documentation that contains matters 
The court records definition includes 
[d. 
discovery, not filed of record, concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect 
upon the general public health or safety, or the administration of public office, or the 
operation of government. . . . 
109 See TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991); Doggett & Mucchetti, supra 
note 57, at 662. 
uo [d. 
111 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
U2 [d. at 33; see also Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 660. 
U3 See Siegel, supra note 57, at 1. 
U4 See Herring, supra note 108, at 24; Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 663-68. 
U5 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). 
U6 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 660-61. 
117 Anderson, 805 F.2d at 7. 
U8 Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 661. 
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concerning public health, safety or the operations of a governmental 
agency are even considered court records for purposes of the Rule 
76a balancing test. 119 According to Doggett, Rule 76a is consistent 
with common law discovery privileges and is calculated to disclose 
only discovery evidence reasonably believed to be admissible.12O U n-
der the Rule, Texas courts may continue to issue protective orders 
regarding discovery, but now must make such decisions in accor-
dance with the Rule 76a balancing test. 121 
3. Notice, Hearings, and Temporary Sealing Order 
Rule 76a requires the holding of a public hearing before any sealing 
order is issued. 122 As part of the hearing process, movant must post 
notice of the hearing where meetings of county governmental bodies 
are usually posted. 123 This public notice must contain a brief descrip-
tion of the documents that the movant is requesting to have sealed, 
the moving party's identity, the location and time of the hearing, 
and the fact that the hearing is open to any party or nonparty 
intervenor.124 The court will hold a hearing on the motion no earlier 
than fourteen days after proper notice is posted and the motion is 
filed. 125 In the interim period between the filing of the motion and 
119 See TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991); Doggett & Mucchetti, supra 
note 57, at 662. 
120 Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 662. 
121 See Doggett, supra note 86, at 63. 
122 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
123 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(3) (West Supp. 1991). The section provides that 
[c]ourt records may be sealed only upon a party's written motion, which shall be 
open to public inspection. The movant shall post a public notice at the place where 
notices for meetings of county governmental bodies are required to be posted. . .. 
[d. 
124 [d. The section provides that 
[d. 
notice must state that a hearing will be held in open court on a motion to seal court 
records in the specific case; that any person may intervene and be heard concerning 
the sealing of court records; the specific time and place of the hearing; the style and 
number of the case; a brief but specific description of both the nature of the case and 
the court records which are sought to be sealed; and the identity of the movant. 
Immediately after posting such notice, the movant shall file a verified copy of the 
posted notice with the clerk of the court in which the case is pending and with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas. 
125 [d. (4). The section provides that 
[a] hearing, open to the public, on a motion to seal court records shall be held in open 
court as soon as practicable, but not less than fourteen days after the motion is filed 
and notice is posted. Any party may participate in the hearing. Non-parties may 
intervene as a matter of right for the limited purpose of participating in the pro-
1993] ANTISECRECY LEGISLATION 387 
the hearing, the court may issue a temporary sealing order if the 
movant sufficiently demonstrates that it will suffer irremediable 
injury before the posting of notice or the hearing. 126 A judicial order 
on a motion to seal court records is based on pleadings, affidavits, 
discovery results and oral testimony, and such order must contain, 
in writing, the specific balancing test findings and reasons for those 
findings along with the portion of the record sealed and the duration 
of the sealing order. 127 
4. Challenging a Rule 76a Sealing Order 
Another controversial provision of Rule 76a recognizes the public's 
right to challenge a sealing order at any time. l28 Under Rule 76a, 
the court that issued the sealing order retains continuing jurisdiction 
over the sealed documents. 129 This continuing jurisdiction empowers 
the court to enforce, alter, or vacate any order.130 Rule 76a allows 
[d. 
ceedings, upon payment of the fee required for filing a plea of intervention. The court 
may inspect records in camera when necessary. 
126 [d. (5). The section provides that 
[d. 
[aJ temporary sealing order may issue upon . . . showing of a compelling need from 
specific facts shown by affidavit or by verified petition that immediate and irreparable 
injury will result to a specific interest of the applicant before notice can be posted 
and a hearing held as otherwise provided herein. . . . The court may modify or 
withdraw any temporary order upon motion by any party or intervenor, notice to all 
parties, and hearing conducted as soon as practicable. Issuance of a temporary order 
shall not reduce in any way the burden of proof of a party requesting sealing at the 
hearing required by paragraph 4. 
127 [d. (6) (1990). The section provides that 
[d. 
[aJ motion relating to sealing or unsealing court records shall be decided by written 
order, open to the public, which shall state: the style and number of the case; the 
specific reasons for the finding and concluding whether the showing required by 
paragraph 1 has been made; the specific portions of court records which are to be 
sealed; and the time period for which the sealed portions of the court records are to 
be sealed. The order shall not be included in any judgement or other order but shall 
be a separate document in the case; however, the failure to comply with this require-
ment shall not affect its appealability. 
128 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 681. 
129 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(7) (West Supp. 1991). 
130 [d. The section provides that 
[aJny person may intervene as a matter of right at any time before or after judgement 
to seal or unseal court records. A court that issues a sealing order retains continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate that order. An order sealing or unsealing 
court records shall not be reconsidered on motion of any party or intervenor, who 
had actual notice of the hearing preceding issuance of the order, without first showing 
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any person to intervene before or after the rendering of judgment 
on the sealing petition.131 The Texas Supreme Court intended to 
allow for public access to sealed documents when circumstances 
surrounding the original sealing order significantly changed and 
thereby rendered the sealing order invalid. 132 This provision has 
sparked opposition from defense attorneys who criticize the lack of 
security and finality that accompany a sealing order under Rule 
76a. 133 
5. The Rule 76a Appeal Process 
Rule 76a sets forth a process for appeal of sealing order deci-
sions. l34 Any party that participated in the original sealing hearing 
may appeal any court order or portion of an order or judgment. 135 
The appellate court is not only empowered to reverse trial court 
decisions but also is free either to reapply Rule 76a's balancing test 
or to redetermine whether the documents in question are properly 
categorized as "court records. "136 
6. Rule 76a's Past and Future 
As of March 1992, available statistics showed that 181 Rule 76a 
hearing notices have been filed with the Texas Supreme Court 
Clerk. 137 These motions have involved cases covering a variety of 
topics, including business information, academic records, trade se-
[d. 
changed circumstances materially affecting the order. Such circumstances need not 
be related to the case in which the order was issued. However, the burden of making 
the showing required by paragraph 1 shall always be on the party seeking to seal 
records. 
131 [d. 
132 See Doggett, supra note 86, at 64. 
133 See Tuma, supra note 89, at 4. 
134 TEX. R. elV. P. ANN. r. 76a(8) (West Supp. 1991). 
135 [d. The section provides that 
[d. 
[a]ny order (or portion of an order or judgement) relating to sealing or unsealing 
court records shall be deemed to .be severed from the case and a final judgement 
which may be appealed by any party or intervenor who participated in the hearing 
preceding issuance of such order. The appellate court may abate the appeal and order 
the trial court to direct that further public notice be given, or to hold further hearings, 
or to make additional findings. 
136 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 683. 
137 See Janet Elliott, Ford's 76aLoss Sets Stage for Appeal, TEX. LAW., Mar. 23, 1992, at 
4. 
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crets, settlement accords, and the identity of a sexual abuse vic-
tim. 138 Defense attorneys, working with statistics from only the first 
fourteen motions to seal court records, paint a discouraging picture 
of Rule 76a'seffectiveness. 139 Statistics show that courts granted 
eight of the nine motions for secrecy filed as of December 3, 1990. 140 
In five of those cases, the judge sealed the entire file. 141 Of the nine 
requests for confidentiality, only five were opposed, and in only one 
of the nine hearings did the proceedings last more than five min-
utes. 142 Nonetheless, to date, there has been no appellate review of 
Rule 76a. 
Despite mixed reviews of the effectiveness of the Texas model, 
the Wisconsin Senate has proposed an even more radical version of 
Rule 76a that creates stringent standards for judicially approved 
limiting access orders. 143 The most far-reaching of the antisecrecy 
legislation proposed to date, the Wisconsin statute would adopt Rule 
76a's "presumption of openness" for court records, but would go 
further to include all discovery in any matter before the court within 
the statute's broad definition of "court records." This expands 76a's 
inclusion within the "court record" definition of only discovery that 
has an adverse effect on the general public health or safety.144 Fi-
nally, Wisconsin's bill would immediately grant to any public official 
or other litigant access to information or documents within the stat-
ute's "court records" definition. 145 This access to court records would 
138 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 678, n.177. 
139 See Ballard, supra note 95, at l. 
140 [d. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. In the one case in which the sealing hearing lasted more than five minutes, it appears 
the judge placed the burden on the plaintiff's lawyer to show why the court should not grant 
the motion. This is a misreading of the rule and cuts against Rule 76a's presumption of 
openness of all civil court records. [d. 
143 WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg.,(1991). (As of May 22, 1992 the Wisconsin Senate Committee on 
Judiciary and Consumer Affairs has amended and recommended a substitute bill for Senate 
Bill 213. Both bill proposals are pending). [d. 
144 [d. at § 3 (1)(b). The section provides that "the records of all civil actions include all 
discovery in any matter before the court, whether or not the discovery is filed with or 
submitted to the court." [d. 
145 [d. at § 3 (3). 
ACCESS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND LITIGANTS. No court may enter 
an order limiting the access of any of the following persons to any of the information 
or documents referred to in sub. (1), even when the standards in sub. (2) have been 
met, if those persons submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose 
of enforcement of the court's order limiting access: (a) A federal, state or local official 
with regulatory, investigative, administrative, legislative, judicial, law enforcement 
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be absolute, regardless of the outcome of a party's motion to limit 
access, if the information is relevant to the public official or liti-
gant.146 
B. Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act 
Similar to Texas' Rule 76a, the Sunshine in Litigation Act ("the 
Act") is the Florida legislature's attempt to eliminate protective and 
sealing orders, as well as private agreements and contracts that 
conceal information concerning public hazards. 147 The Act provides 
that courts may not enter an order or judgment that conceals either 
a public hazard or any information pertaining to a public hazard. 148 
The Act further prohibits courts from entering protective orders or 
judgements that conceal any information that the general public may 
find useful to protect itself from the dangers of a public hazard. 149 
Under the Act, any person "substantially affected" by an order, 
judgment, agreement, or contract that violates any of the Act's 
provisions has standing to contest the violating instrument. 15o To 
contest an order or judgment, a person may file a motion with the 
court that originally entered the order or judgment. 151 
To void a contract or agreement, a person may bring a declaratory 
judgment action in any court.152 The primary purposes of the Act 
are to provide greater public access to information concerning 
[d. 
or other responsibility in regard to which the information or documents are relevant; 
(b) A litigant or an attorney for a litigant in a case or potential case in regard to 
which the information or documents are relevant. 
146 [d. 
147 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 1991). 
148 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3) (West Supp. 1991). The provision states that "except 
pursuant to this section, no court shall enter an order or judgement which has the purpose or 
effect of concealing a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard .... " [d. 
149 [d. The provision states that a court shall not " ... enter an order or judgement which 
has the purpose or effect of concealing any information which may be useful to members of 
the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard." [d. 
150 See, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(6) (West Supp. 1991). The provision states that "[a]ny 
substantially affected person, including but not limited to representatives of news media, has 
standing to contest an order, judgment, agreement, or contract that violates this section." [d. 
151 [d. The provision states that "[a] person may contest an order, judgment, agreement, or 
contract that violates this section by motion in the court that entered the order or 
judgment ... " [d. 
152 [d. The provision also states that a declaratory judgement action may be brought pur-
suant to chapter 86 of Florida law to contest an order or judgment, agreement or contract. 
[d. 
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hazards153 and to give every individual, including representatives of 
the news media,l54 a means to nullify secrecy deals. 155 
Unlike its Texas counterpart, the Act moved quickly through the 
Florida legislature despite resistance from the powerful automobile 
and drug manufacturing lobbies. 156 The Act's passage immediately 
sparked opposition among defense attorneys and business interests, 
but opponents have yet to mount a legal challenge to the statute. 157 
No state wide empirical data is currently available to evaluate the 
Act's effectiveness from a numerical standpoint. 
1. The Act's Definition of Public Hazard 
The Act defines "public hazard" as any device, instrument, person, 
procedure, product, or condition thereof, that has caused and is likely 
to cause injury.l58 The inclusion of individuals, products, and proce-
dures in the definition of potential hazards is an attempt to address 
three major categories of secrecy agreements: those in medical mal-
practice, products liability, and environmental contamination suits. 159 
The open-ended phrase "including but not limited to" within the 
definition of "public hazard" allows courts to apply the Act to any 
potential "public hazard." As a result, this phrase has become a focal 
point of opposition attack. 160 Critics feel that the definition of "public 
hazard" is overly broad and will be the source of constant interpre-
tive legislation for years to come, thus rendering the Act ineffec-
tive. 161 
2. Voiding Agreements of Contracts that Conceal Public Hazards 
The protection of the public from the concealment of "public haz-
ards" provided in the Act extends beyond the confines of the court-
153 See Secrecy Doesn't Serve Safety, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 19, 1990, at A-18. 
154 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(6) (West Supp. 1991). Members of the media are included 
in the paragraph six definition of "substantially affected person(s)." [d. 
155 See Secrecy Doesn't Serve Safety, supra note 153, at A-18. 
156 See Adrienne C. Locke, Florida Law Opens Settlement Records, Bus. INS., June 15, 
1990, at 21. (bill swept through Senate 34-2, and reached 2/3 majority needed in House by 79-
30 vote); House Passes Legislation on Open Records for Products, TALLAHASSEE DEM., May 
29, 1990, at 4C. 
157 See Jud Magrin, Senate OKs Sunshine Bill; Martinez is Next, GAINESVILLE SUN, May 
31, 1990, at 1. (critics believed Florida courts would overturn Act first time anyone sought to 
apply it). [d. 
158 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(6) (West Supp. 1991). 
159 See Abraham Fuchsberg, The Blindfold of Justice, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4,1990, at 2. 
160 See Jud Magrin, Public Hazards Bill Gets First OK, THE GAINESVILLE SUN, Apr. 25, 
1990, at lB, 6B. 
161 [d. 
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room to reach private contracts and agreements. 162 The Act provides 
that any portion of a contract or agreement that conceals either a 
"public hazard", or information pertaining to a hazard or useful to 
the public in safeguarding themselves from injury that may result 
from a hazard, is contrary to public policy and void. 163 
The Act, however, offers protection for parties from unsubstan-
tiated attempts to reveal the contents of documentation or gain the 
release of specific information. l64 The Act provides a mechanism by 
which, upon motion and good cause by a party seeking to prevent 
information disclosure, the court may grant an in camera review of 
the materials in question. 165 If, upon review, the court finds that the 
materials or any portion of the materials violate any provision of the 
Act, then the court must allow public disclosure of the materials. 166 
Privacy interests such as corporate trade secrets are an appropriate 
subject for in camera review. 167 The Act further endeavors to protect 
the privacy interests of the parties by requiring courts ordering 
disclosure to release only that portion of the materials in question 
that pertains to the "public hazard. "168 
The Florida legislature passed amendments to the Sunshine in 
Litigation Act in 1991 in an effort to hold the Florida state govern-
ment to a higher level of accountability in its efforts to settle claims 
against the state. 169 The amendment declares void and unenforceable 
any settlement agreement that conceals information relating to the 
162 See Secrecy Doesn't Serve Safety, supra note 153, at A-18. 
163 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West Supp. 1991). The provision states that "[a]ny portion 
of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, 
any information concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be useful to 
members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public 
hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced." Id. 
164 Id. (7). The provision states that "[u]pon motion and good cause shown by a party 
attempting to prevent disclosure of information or materials which have not previously been 
disclosed, including but not limited to alleged trade secrets, the court shall examine the 
disputed information or materials in camera." I d. 
165 Id. 
166 I d. The provision states that 
Id. 
[i]f the court finds that the information or materials or portions thereof consist of 
information concerning a public hazard or information which may be useful to mem-
bers of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from a 
public hazard, the court shall allow disclosure of the information or materials. 
167Id. (5). The provision states that "[t]rade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 which are not 
pertinent to public hazards shall be protected pursuant to chapter 688." I d. 
168 Id.(7). The provision states that if the court allows for disclosure, "the court shall allow 
disclosure of only that portion of the information or materials necessary or useful to the public 
regarding the public health." I d. 
169 See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(8H9) (West Supp. 1991). 
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resolution of a claim against the state or its agencies. 170 Standing 
requirements are identical to that of the "public hazard" provi-
sions,171 and a failure to disclose any agreement, contract, record, 
or document in connection with the settlement of a claim against the 
state is punishable by sanctions. 172 
IV. FEDERAL ANTISECRECY GOALS AND PURPOSES 
The time has come for federal legislation that will put an end to 
the proliferation of secret settlements and limited access orders. 
Congress must create a comprehensive yet manageable federal ju-
dicial standard for the sealing of court records and the issuing of 
protective orders to prevent business interests and individuals from 
withholding information concerning public hazards from the public. 
"Openness" legislation can work at the federal level even though 
similar state efforts have failed because there is less threat of cre-
ating an unattractive business environment on the national landscape 
than there is within any individual state that may weigh this con-
sequence of antisecrecy legislation heavily in its adoption process. 173 
The goals of federal antisecrecy legislation should be threefold. 
First and foremost, such legislation should provide the public with 
access to information concerning hazards that may adversely affect 
its health and safety. In addition, legislation should discourage at-
tempts to use the federal court system as a vehicle to conceal public 
hazards. Finally, federal antisecrecy legislation should curtail judicial 
discretion to limit access to court records by reestablishing and 
reaffirming the adversarial system as the proper judicial process to 
foster informed decision making. 
17°Id. (8)(a). The provision states that 
Id. 
[alny portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing 
information relating to the settlement or resolution of any claim or action against the 
state, its agencies, or subdivisions or against any municipality or constitutionally 
created body or commission is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be 
enforced. 
171 Id.; see supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
172Id. (8)(c). The provision states that "[flailure of any custodian to disclose and provide 
any document, record, contract, or agreement as set forth in this section shall be subject to 
the sanctions as set forth in chapter 119." Id. 
A government entity that settles a tort claim for more then $5000 must post notice of the 
settlement in the county in which the claim arose if the settlement has not first been approved 
by a Florida court. Id. at (9). 
173 See Saundra Torry, Texas Supreme Court Curbs Secrecy of Lawsuit Records; Far-
Reaching Action Focuses on Public Health, Safety, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1990, at A2. 
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A federal antisecrecy law would serve complimentary purposes. 
First, legislation creating a presumption of openness for all court 
records would work to dissipate the "hush money" factor which is a 
powerful tool for defense attorneys and a risk-free solution for de-
fendants who wish to minimize the possibility of future similar liti-
gation. 174 A federal law that guarantees secrecy only for nonhazar-
dous trade secrets175 and personal and confidential business 
information should dissolve a business interest's desire to enter into 
hush money settlements because the presumption of openness that 
would accompany all court records, including settlements, would 
allow public access to the settlement. 
Second, such a statute would eliminate the ethical dilemma that 
accompanies a large monetary offer to settle a suit at the expense 
of concealing a hazard. 176 Incentive to settle wouid still exist for all 
the reasons that make settlement attractive in the first place, yet 
the "hush money" exchange for a no-fault resolution will no longer 
be the stimulus. Finally, the public will benefit from a federal anti-
secrecy law because information concerning public hazards of every 
kind would become available to the pUblic. 
Federal antisecrecy legislation would go a long way to change the 
perception of the civil lawsuit. 177 If the courts, and the lawsuit in 
particular, are the current vehicle for change,178 then legislation is 
needed that will provide both access to the courts to those willing 
to fight for change, and protection for those unable to afford the 
fight. The question then arises as to what would constitute a com-
prehensive yet manageable federal law that will effectively safe-
guard the public from concealment of future public hazards. 
The federal law that this Comment proposes in Section IV at-
tempts to replace the ineffective FRCP 26(c) by combining the goal 
of disclosing public hazard information that underlies the Sunshine 
in Litigation Act with the due process-oriented, adversarial mecha-
nism of Rule 76a. This proposed statute should work to frustrate 
attempts to conceal environmental, product, and medical malpractice 
hazards. This proposal attempts to reach a compromise between the 
17. See Jaffe, supra rwte 4, § 3, at 1. 
176 Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081, (2) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 158 and accompanying 
text. 
176 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
177 Abrahamson, supra note 28, at 1, Metro, part B. Professor Mary Cheh of George 
Washington University Law School feels that ''the fight over secrecy signals that the legal 
system is in the throes of completely changing the perception of a civil lawsuit." [d. 
178 See id. 
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business interests of corporate America, specifically the protection 
of the trade secret, and the public right of access to court records. 179 
v. THE MODEL ACT: A FEDERAL ANTISECRECY LAW 
ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR LIMITING ACCESS To 
COURT RECORDS IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
1) Public Hazard. As used in this section a public hazard means an 
instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, 
person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, 
person, procedure, or product, that has caused and is likely to cause 
injury. ISO 
2) Court Records. The following information or documents are con-
sidered court records for the purposes of this statute: 
A) all documents of any nature filed with, submitted to, or issued 
by the court, except: 
1) documents filed with a court in camera, solely for the purpose 
of obtaining a ruling on the discoverability of such documents;I81 
2) documents in court files to which access is restricted by law;182 
B) discovery, in any matter before the court, whether or not filed 
with, or submitted to the court, not including: 
1) any information qualifying as a trade secret that does not 
conceal a public hazard, or information which may be useful to the 
public in protecting themselves from a public hazard. 183 
C) all settlement agreements, whether or not filed with the court, 
excluding all references to monetary considerations. 184 
3) Balancing Test for Motion to Limit Access to Court Records. 
All court records, as defined by this statute, are presumed open to 
the general public's inspection. A party seeking a protective order, 
the dismissal of a suit predicated on a confidential settlement, or a 
sealing order shall bear the burden for its justification. 
179 See supra notes 33, 42--45 and accompanying text. 
180 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (2) (West Supp. 1991). 
181 TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(2)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991). 
182 [d. at (2)(a)(2). 
183 C[ id.(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991); supra notes 103-21 and accompanying text. 
184 C[ TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(2)(b) (West Supp. 1991). The provision includes within 
its' definition of court records "settlement agreements, not filed of record, excluding all 
reference to any monetary consideration, that seek to restrict disclosure of information con-
cerning matters that have a probable adverse effect upon general public health and safety, or 
the administration of public office, or the operation of government." [d. 
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A) Upon motion to limit access, a court shall conduct an in camera 
examination of the materials in question. A court shall approve the 
release of notification for a pending public hearing upon a finding 
that: 
1) there is a specific, serious and substantial interest in limiting 
access that clearly outweighs the public right to access; 
2) the materials in question do not conceal a public hazard, any 
information concerning a public hazard, or any information which 
may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves 
from injury which may result from the hazard;185 
3) no less restrictive means than limiting access to the court 
records will protect the parties privacy rights. 
Upon completion of a public hearing, a court may enter an order 
limiting access to any of the information or documents referred to 
in section (2) only upon finding, in light of information obtained 
through the hearing process, that the requirements of section (3)(A) 
have been met. 186 
4) Access by Government Officials. 
A) No court may enter an order limiting access to information 
or documents referred to in section (2), to any federal or state 
government official with regulatory, investigative, administrative, 
legislative, judicial, law enforcement or other responsibility in re-
gard to which the information or documents are relevant, even when 
the standards in section (3) have been met. 
B) Any federal or state government official with regulatory, 
investigative, administrative, legislative, judicial, law enforcement 
or other responsibility shall comply with any order or agreement to 
limit access to the information or documentation in question, unless 
disclosure is necessary as part of a proceeding, undertaken by the 
federal or state governmental official against or involving the party 
that the information or documentation concerns, to protect the health 
and safety of the general pUblic. 187 
5) Notice. Within 4 days of court approval of a public hearing, 
movant must post a notice in a location accessible to the public in 
185 Cj. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (3) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 148-49 and accompanying 
text. 
186 Cj. TEX. R. elV. P. ANN. r. 76a(1) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 94 and accompanying 
text. 
187 Cj. WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3 (3) (1991); supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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the federal courthouse in a place provided for that purpose by the 
court. Movant must also file notice with the United States Attorney 
General's Office assigned to the court. Movant must provide a copy 
of the notice, free of charge, to any person who requests a copy. 
The notice shall include all of the following: 
A. The time and place the public hearing will be held. 
B. The identity of the person who filed the motion, including 
names, addresses, and phone numbers of the attorneys for the par-
ties in the civil action. 
C. The caption and file number of the civil action. 
D. A brief, specific description of the nature of the case and the 
information or documents that the person requests be withheld from 
access. 
E. Notification that any person may intervene and be heard con-
cerning the request to limit access. 
Immediately after posting such notice the movant shall file a ver-
ified copy of the posted notice and an affidavit stating that the notice 
was posted and filed with the assigned United States Attorney Gen-
eral's Office with the clerk of the court in which the case is pending. 
The clerk of the court shall maintain a file of notices, filed under this 
subsection, and orders issued under section (3) that will be open to 
the public during regular business hours. 188 
6) Hearing and Temporary Sealing or Protective Orders. 
A) A public hearing on the motion shall be held as soon as 
practicable, but not less then 14 days after the motion is filed and 
notice is posted. Any party may participate in the hearing. Non 
parties may go on record as intervening for the limited purpose of 
participating in the proceedings. If, upon the discretion of the court, 
188 See TEX. R. Cry. P. ANN. r. 76a(3) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 123-24 and accom-
panying text; cf Wis. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(5) (1991). The Wisconsin provision states that 
(a) [o]n the day on which a motion is filed requesting a court to issue an order limiting 
access to records in civil actions, the person who filed the motion shall post a notice 
in a location accessible to the public in the county courthouse in a place provided for 
that purpose by the county. The person who filed the motion shall provide a copy of 
the notice, free of charge, to any person who requests a copy. The notice shall include 
all of the following: 1. The identity of the person who filed the motion. 2. The names, 
addresses and phone numbers of the attorneys for the parties in the civil action. 3. 
The caption and file number of the civil action. 4. The time and place when a hearing 
will be held on the motion. 5. A brief, specific description of the nature of the case 
and the information or documents that the person requests be withheld from access. 
6. A statement that any person, subject to 803.09, may intervene for the limited 
purpose of being heard on matters relevant to the motion. 
Id. Wrs. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3 (5) (1991). 
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it is not feasible to conduct an open hearing, an in camera review 
may be undertaken with the aid of affidavits. 
B) Upon motion and notice to all parties, the court, in its 
discretion, may issue a temporary sealing or protective order upon 
a showing of compelling need from specific facts demonstrated by 
affidavit or by verified petition that immediate and irreparable injury 
will result to a specific interest of the applicant before a formal in 
camera review can be held. A temporary sealing or protective order 
may be modified or withdrawn by the court upon in camera review 
of the motion to limit access to court records as provided in section 
(3), and is automatically withdrawn upon commencement of the hear-
ing as provided in part A of section (5).189 
7) Order on Motion to Limit Access. A motion to limit access shall 
be decided by written order that rules solely on the motion and 
states the specific reasons for finding whether or not the standards 
required in section (3)(A) have been met. The written order shall 
state a) the style and number of the case, b) the time and place the 
public hearing was held, c) the identity of the movant including 
names, addresses, and phone numbers of the attorneys for the par-
ties in the civil action, d) a brief, specific description of the nature 
of the case and the information or documents that movant requests 
be withheld from access, e) all parties and nonparties that partici-
pated in the hearing, f) the specific reasons for finding and concluding 
whether the showing required by section (3) has been made, g) and 
the information or documents to which an order limiting access 
applies, who is denied access, and the time period that access is 
denied. The order shall not be included in any judgment or other 
order but shall be a separate document in the case; however, failure 
to comply with this requirement shall not affect its appealability. A 
copy of the order shall be filed with the clerk of the court for inclusion 
in the files created under section (5)(e), and with the applicable 
United States Attorney General's Office. 1OO 
189 Cf. TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1991); supra notes 125-27 and 
accompanying text. 
190 See TEx. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(6) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 127 and accompanying 
text; see also Wis. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(8) (1991). The provision states that 
[a] motion to limit access shall be decided by a written order that rules solely on the 
motion and states the specific reasons for finding and concluding whether or not the 
standards required under sub. (2) have been met. If the court finds and concludes 
that the standards have been met, the court shall, except as provided in sub. (3), 
issue a written order limiting access. The written order shall specify the information 
or documents that the order applies to, who is denied access and the time period that 
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8) Appeal of Order on Motion to Limit Access. Any order or portion 
of an order ruling on a motion to limit access or any other request 
to limit access to information or documents referred to in section (3) 
shall be appealable by any party or intervenor who participated in 
the hearing preceding issuance of such order. The appellate court 
may, in light of section (3) requirements, reverse the order, or abate 
the appeal and order the trial court to direct that further public 
notice be given, or to hold further hearings, or to make additional 
findings. 191 
9) Continuing Jurisdiction. A court that enters an order under this 
section limiting access to court records retains continuing jurisdiction 
to enforce, alter, or vacate the order. Any person may bring a motion 
to enforce, alter, or vacate that order, subject to this section. An 
order shall not be reconsidered on motion of any party or intervenor 
who had actual notice of the hearing preceding issuance of the order, 
or who subsequently challenged the order, unless the party or in-
tervenor shows that circumstances materially affecting the order 
have changed. Such circumstances need not be related to the case 
in which the order was issued. No order limiting access shall remain 
in effect unless the standards in section (3) are met at the time when 
the order is challenged or reconsidered. 192 
access is denied. Any order limiting access shall ensure that access is denied only to 
information or documents in regard to which the standards required under sub. (2) 
have been met. A copy of the order shall be filed with the clerk of the supreme court 
and the clerk of circuit court for inclusion in the files created under sub. (5)(b). 
[d. WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(8) (1991). 
191 See TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(8) (West Supp. 1991); supra notes 132-34 and accom-
panying text; see also WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(9) (1991). The provision states that U[a]ny 
order or portion of an order ruling on a motion to limit access or any other request to limit 
access to information or documents referred to in sub. (1) shall be appealable pursuant to 
Section 808.03 (1) by any person who had the right to be heard in the hearing." 
WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(9) (1991). 
192 See TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(7) (West Supp. 1991); supra notes 129-33 and accom-
panying text; see also WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(10) (1991). The Wisconsin provision states 
that 
[a] court that enters an order under this section limiting access retains continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce, alter or vacate that order. Any person may bring a motion to 
enforce, alter or vacate that order, subject to this section. An order shall not be 
reconsidered at the request of a party or intervenor who had actual notice of the 
hearing preceding issuance of that order unless the party or intervenor shows that 
some relevant circumstances, not necessarily related to the case in which the order 
was entered, has changed. No order limiting access shall remain in effect unless the 
standards in sub. (2) are met at the time when the order is challenged or reconsidered. 
WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(10) (1991). 
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10) Return and Destruction of Documents. No court may enter an 
order requiring any litigant, attorney, government official, or mem-
ber of the public to return or destroy any legally obtained informa-
tion or document referred to in section (2).193 
11) Agreements and Orders to the Contrary are Void. Any portion 
of any agreement, contract, stipulation, or court order that is con-
trary to the provisions of this section are void, contrary to public 
policy, and may not be enforced. 194 
VI. THE MODEL ACT: EXPLAINED 
1) Public Hazard. As used in this section a public hazard means 
an instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, in-
strument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, 
instrument, person, procedure, or product, that has caused and 
is likely to cause injury. 
Paragraph 1 of the Model Act, defines "public hazard" as used in 
the Sunshine in Litigation Act. 195 This definition, in conjunction with 
the paragraph (3) balancing test of the Model Act, specifically targets 
environmental hazards, medical malpractice or misconduct, and de-
fective products196 as the most prominent and dangerous sources of 
public hazard. This broad definition would leave the classification of 
a public hazard open to judicial interpretation and provide for the 
adaptability of the Model Act to undiscovered future hazards. 197 
Critics have attacked this definition of "public hazard" as over-
broad and dangerously inclusive. 198 Certainly this definition gives a 
judge discretion to determine what constitutes a public hazard. 199 
"Device", "instrument", "person", "procedure" and "product" are 
193 WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(11) (1991). 
194 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (4) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 162-63; see also WIS. 
S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(14) (1991). The provision states that "[a]1I provisions in contracts, 
agreements, stipulations and court orders that are contrary to the provisions of this section 
are void." 
WIS. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(14) (1991). 
195 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 158 and accompanying 
text. 
196 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text. 
197 [d. 
198 See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Conjidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 457, 482-83. Marcus argues that the Sunshine in Litigation Act is overinclusive. He 
states that even an individual who carries the AIDS virus can be classified under the Act as 
a "proven risk of injury to others" and thus a public hazard. [d. 
199 See id. 
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broad terms, but are restricted by the clause "that has caused and 
is likely to cause injury. "200 To qualify as a public hazard for purposes 
of the Model Act, there would have to exist, in the judge's discretion, 
a continuing threat to public safety from a source proven to cause 
injury in the past.201 Difficult cases that call for line-drawing by the 
judge in weighing the privacy rights of the individual versus the 
need for public disclosure will exist. Yet this type of judicial discre-
tion exists in most legislation and in time will be determinative in 
assessing the law's overall effectiveness. 
2) Court Records. The following information or documents are 
considered court records for the purposes of this statute: 
A) all documents of any nature filed with, submitted to, or 
issued by the court, except: 
1) documents filed with a court in camera, solely for the 
purpose of obtaining a ruling on the discoverability of such doc-
uments; 
2) documents in court files to which access is restricted by 
law; 
B) discovery, in any matter before the court, whether or not 
filed with, or submitted to the court, not including: 
1) any information qualifying as a trade secret that does not 
conceal a public hazard, or information which may be useful to 
the public in protecting themselves from a public hazard. 
C) all settlement agreements, whether or not filed with the 
court, excluding all references to monetary considerations. 
Modeled after the similar provision in Rule 76a, the Model Act's 
definition of "court records" encompasses the wide spectrum of in-
formation exchanged in civil litigation.202 Like in the Rule 76a pro-
vision, Model Act section 2(a) includes much of the documentation 
comprising a civil suit in order to prevent creative lawyers from 
circumventing the reach of the Act.203 The "court records" definition, 
however, creates an exception for documents filed with the court as 
part of an in camera review to determine the discoverability of the 
documents, and documents to which access is restricted by law. The 
purpose of these exceptions is to give parties the procedural safe-
guards that the law has traditionally provided. 204 
200 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 158 and accompanying 
text. 
201 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (West Supp. 1991). 
202 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 658; supra notes 100-21 and accompanying 
text. 
203 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
204 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 659. 
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In order for the public to have access to documentation containing 
information pertaining to public hazards, the Model Act includes 
pretrial discovery documentation within its definition of "court rec-
ords." On the one hand, allowing access to discovery materials may 
create more lawsuits and facilitate the role of the plaintiffs' attorney 
in subsequent litigation by granting plaintiffs access to possibly dam-
aging documentation of the defendant at no cost.205 On the other 
hand, if the goal behind the presumption of openness is to prevent 
the concealment of information pertinent to public health and safety, 
then the Model Act must open to public inspection and analysis any 
documentation that reveals a public hazard. Thus, the definition of 
"court records" must include pretrial discovery so that a meaningful 
Rule 76a-type balancing test is applied and information pertaining 
to public hazards is disclosed.206 
To protect innovation and investment in business, the definition 
of "court records" excludes trade secrets unless the trade secret 
conceals either a public hazard or information that may be useful to 
citizens in protecting themselves from a public hazard.207 This public 
hazard scrutiny ensures that secrets that have the effect of conceal-
ing information pertinent to preventing injury to the public are no 
longer exempted under the catch-all categorization of trade se-
crets.208 
Permitting the disclosure of trade secret information that may be 
useful for citizens' self-protection would appear to put highly tech-
nical corporate secrets in a precarious position by classifying them 
as court records and subjecting them to the Model Act's balancing 
test.209 Nevertheless, it is precisely the technical nature of the trade 
205 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. Defense attorneys have charged that the 
impetus behind the plaintiffs bar- support for the "openness movement" is a well-disguised 
effort to obtain marketable information. See Baltz, supra note 6, at 1. 
206 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. But see Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 
F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) ("A public right of access would unduly complicate the [discovery] 
process. It would require the court to make extensive evidentiary findings whenever a request 
for access was made, and this could in turn lead to lengthy and expensive interlocutory 
appeals"); Marcus, supra note 198, at 484-85. 
207 See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held that 
confidential business information and trade secrets are protected under the 5th Amendment 
takings clause. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984); Gale 
R. Peterson, Proposed Rule 76a: A Radical Turning Point for Trade Secrets, 53 TEX. B.J. 
344, 345 (1990). 
208 See TEX. R. elV. PRO. ANN. r. 76a(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991); supra notes 102-07 and 
accompanying text. 
209 See Gale Peterson, Proposed 76a: A Radical Turning Point for Trade Secrets, TEX. B. 
J., April 1990, at 344. Peterson considers Rule 76a a serious threat to the security of trade 
secrets in the state of Texas and to the desirability of doing business in Texas in genera!. [d. 
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secret that makes this provision necessary. Judges cannot easily 
identify the concealed public hazards within a highly sophisticated 
and industry-specific trade secret. Thus, the Model Act's adversarial 
hearing process and its special in camera review for potentially 
sensitive information are necessary to allow judges to make educated 
decisions regarding whether trade secrets contain pertinent health 
and safety information. 
Finally, paragraph 2(c) includes all settlement agreements within 
the Act's definition of "court records." No longer would a cash offer 
be sufficient to assure the confidentiality of damaging and potentially 
hazardous information. 210 The aim of this provision is to reach not 
only those settlements filed with the court but also private settle-
ment contracts that are employed in an attempt to circumvent the 
"court records" definition. 211 
3) Balancing Test for Motion to Limit Access to Court Rec-
ords. All court records, as defined by this statute, are presumed 
open to the general public's inspection. A party seeking a pro-
tective order, the dismissal of a suit predicated on a confidential 
settlement, or a sealing order shall bear the burden for its jus-
tification. 
A) Upon motion to limit access, a court shall conduct an in 
camera examination of the materials in question. A court shall 
approve the release of notification for a pending public hearing 
upon a finding that: 
1) there is a specific, serious and substantial interest in 
limiting access that clearly outweighs the public right to access; 
2) the materials in question do not conceal a public hazard, 
any information concerning a public hazard, or any information 
which may be useful to· members of the public in protecting 
themselves from injury which may result from the hazard; 
3) no less restrictive means than limiting access to the court 
records will protect the parties privacy rights. 
Upon completion of a public hearing, a court may enter an 
order limiting access to any of the information or documents 
referred to in section (2) only upon finding, in light of information 
obtained through the hearing process, that the requirements of 
section (3)(A) have been met. 
210 See Siegel, supra note 49, at 1. A woman who sued two laboratories for misreading her 
Pap smear results settled for an undisclosed monetary figure on the conditions that she could 
not talk about the details of her case, and that her file would be sealed. [d. This settlement 
is indicative of the ethical dilemma that arises when plaintiffs must choose between settling 
for large amounts of money, at the expense of keeping relevant public health and safety 
information confidential, and taking their chances with a drawn-out trial while disclosing the 
damaging information to the general public. [d. 1. 
211 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 659. 
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The paragraph 3 balancing test is the heart of the Model Act. Like 
in Rule 76a, the Model Act asserts that all court records are pre-
sumed open to the public. 212 The Model Act targets sealing and 
protective orders, and suit dismissals predicated on confidential set-
tlements, in an effort to cover most court orders to limit access to 
court records. 
Instead of immediately initiating the hearing process as in Rule 
76a,213 the Model Act provides for an in camera review to screen all 
motions to limit access to court records. The burden of justifying 
the motion falls squarely on the shoulders of the party moving for 
limited access. The movant shall present all information and docu-
mentation supporting its motion. As a means of weeding out unwor-
thy motions, a judge would apply the balancing test after viewing 
only the documentation for which a sealing order is sought and the 
moving party's supporting documentation for limiting access. If, on 
the basis of the information presented by the movant only, the judge 
were to find that the movant has a specific, serious, and substantial 
privacy interest that clearly outweighs the public right to access, 
then the judge would approve the release of notice to the general 
public of a subsequent hearing date. 
Whether the movant's privacy interest constitutes such a substan-
tial interest would be a fact-specific and discretionary judicial deci-
sion. Judicial discretion is fundamental to the development of effi-
cient and consistent law. In order to supplant the "good cause" 
standard of FRCP 26(c) with an effective system of review, the 
courts would have to take seriously the presumption of openness and 
the requirement that the movant show a substantial privacy interest 
before a limiting access order is granted.214 If the judiciary were to 
faithfully follow this balancing test, the result would be fewer mo-
tions to limit access, less of a drain of court time and resources,215 
and a greater protection of the public from hidden hazards. 
Section 3(A)(2) of the balancing test employs the Sunshine in 
Litigation Act's definition of "public hazard. "216 The use of this def-
212 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
213 See TEX. R. Cry. P. ANN. r. 76a(3) (West Supp. 1991). The provision states that U[c]ourt 
records may be sealed only upon a party's written motion ... stating that a hearing will be 
held in open court on a motion to seal court records .... " Id., Wrs. S. 213, 90th Leg., § 3(4) 
(1991). The provision states that U[a]n order limiting access to records in civil actions may 
only be entered after a hearing requested by motion under Section 802.01." Id. 
214 See supra notes 34~5, 56--59 and accompanying text. 
215 See Weaver, supra note 2, at 701. As of March 23, 1992, there had been 181 documented 
attempts to seal records since the court rule became effective on September 1, 1990. Elliott, 
supra note 137, at 4. 
216 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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inition focuses the balancing test process on public health and safety, 
providing a party or non party seeking to oppose a motion to limit 
access with court recognition of public concern for the environment, 
defective products, medical malpractice, and other established 
causes of injury. In addition, judicial evaluation of a motion to limit 
access in the preliminary in camera setting for public hazard content 
would become standard procedure. 
The balancing test also requires the court to determine whether 
there exists a less restrictive means of protecting the movant's 
interest than a limiting access order. This provision thus decreases 
the likelihood that a court will issue a complete limiting access order. 
4) Access by government officials. 
(A) No court may enter an order limiting access to information 
or documents referred to in section (2), to any federal or state 
government official with regulatory, investigative, administra-
tive, legislative, judicial, law enforcement or other responsibility 
in regard to which the information or documents are relevant, 
even when the standards in section (3) have been met. 
(B) Any federal or state government official with regulatory, 
investigative, administrative, legislative, judicial, law enforce-
ment or other responsibility shall comply with any order or 
agreement to limit access to the information or documentation 
in question, unless disclosure is necessary as part of a proceed-
ing, undertaken by the federal or state governmental official 
against or involving the party that the information or documen-
tation concerns, to protect the health and safety of the general 
public. 
Section 4 of the Model Act ensures that government agencies can 
obtain immediate access to information or documentation relevant 
to their agency's activities. This provision would enable a govern-
ment agency to bypass the time consuming discovery process by 
allowing the agency access to all court records regardless of the 
presence of any judicial order limiting access. This easing of the 
discovery process may save lives by shortening agency's response 
time to existing public hazards. No longer will the duplicative dis-
covery process contribute to the public's increased exposure to en-
vironmental and product hazards. 217 
The grant of access to court records to government officials would 
not permit agencies to disclose requested information. If a limiting 
access order accompanies any government-requested court record, 
then the requesting agency must comply with the limiting order 
217 See Marcus, supra note 10, at 1, §B. 
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unless the agency uses the information as part of a "formal proceed-
ing" against or involving the party whom the information concerns. 
The "formal proceeding" requirement for public disclosure of lim-
ited-access court records of the Model Act attempts to remove the 
possibility that political influence, threats or personal vendettas by 
an agency will result from this increased government access. The 
Model Act thus would prohibit a government official from targeting 
a business interest, accessing sealed documents, and then indiscrim-
inately releasing information. Only after an investigation resulting 
in a formal proceeding would a judge allow an agency to disclose the 
court records that the agency requested and analyzed. In addition, 
this provision would act as a check on judicial enforcement of the 
balancing test provisions. With the increased knowledge and spe-
cialization of government agencies in general, public hazard threats 
not unearthed during the course of the public hearing, for purposes 
of the balancing test analysis, will be addressed and disclosed by the 
agencies, if warranted, as part of a formal proceeding. 
5) Notice. Within 4 days of court approval of a public hearing, 
movant must post a notice in a location accessible to the public 
in the federal courthouse in a place provided for that purpose by 
the court. Movant must also file notice with the United States 
Attorney General's Office assigned to the court. Movant must 
provide a copy of the notice, free of charge, to any person who 
requests a copy. The notice shall include all of the following: 
A. The time and place the public hearing will be held. 
B. The identity of the person who filed the motion, including 
names, addresses, and phone numbers of the attorneys for the 
parties in the civil action. 
C. The caption and file number of the civil action. 
D. A brief, specific description of the nature of the case and 
the information or documents that the person requests be with-
held from access. 
E. Notification that any person may intervene and be heard 
concerning the request to limit access. 
Immediately after posting such notice the movant shall file a 
verified copy of the posted notice and an affidavit stating that 
the notice was posted and filed with the assigned United States 
Attorney General's Office with the clerk of the court in which 
the case is pending. The clerk of the court shall maintain a file 
of notices, filed under this subsection, and orders issued under 
section (3) that will be open to the public during regular business 
hours. 
As in Rule 76a, the Model Act's notice provisions provide parties 
and non parties the right to intervene in order to contest a motion 
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to limit access.218 By requiring the posting of notice in the appropri-
ate federal courthouse, this provision attempts to ensure that the 
public is advised of impending hearing dates. The Model Act takes 
the notice requirement of Rule 76a one step further by guaranteeing 
representation of the public interest at limiting access hearings by 
requiring a movant to file notice with the applicable United States 
Attorney General's Office. After reviewing the notice, the Attorney 
General's office could decide either to oppose the motion personally 
at the hearing, to notify the parties it believes will be most interested 
and knowledgeable in opposing the motion, or to refrain from action. 
As a result of the Attorney General's participation in the hearing 
process, a politically accountable party that possesses significant 
financial, legal, and professional resources would represent the pub-
lic interest. 
The Model Act requires that the notice's content be sufficiently 
thorough to inform interested parties of the type of information and 
documents under consideration at the limited access hearing, and of 
the fact that any party has the right to participate. The Act's notice 
provision also requires movant to file both notice, and an affidavit of 
posting and filing with the Attorney General's Office, with the clerk 
of the appropriate court.219 This is done to ensure that proper pro-
cedure is followed, as well as to provide a record of motions to limit 
access and of the disposition of these motions for future legislative 
analysis of the Model Act's effectiveness. 
6) Hearing and Temporary Sealing or Protective Orders. 
A) A public hearing on the motion shall be held as soon as 
practicable, but not less than 14 days after the motion is filed 
and notice is posted. Any party may participate in the hearing. 
Non parties may go on record as intervening for the limited 
purpose of participating in the proceedings. If, upon the discre-
tion of the court, it is not feasible to conduct an open hearing, 
an in camera review may be undertaken with the aid of affida-
vits. 
B) Upon motion and notice to all parties, the court, in its discre-
tion, may issue a temporary sealing or protective order upon a 
showing of compelling need from specific facts demonstrated by 
affidavit or by verified petition that immediate and irreparable 
injury will result to a specific interest of the applicant before a 
formal in camera review can be held. A temporary sealing or 
protective order may be modified or withdrawn by the court 
218 TEX. R. Cry. P. ANN. r. 76a(3) (West Supp. 1991); see supra note 123-24 and accom-
panying text. 
219 See Doggett, supra note 86, at 63. 
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upon in camera review of the motion to limit access to court 
records as provided in section (3), and is automatically with-
drawn upon commencement of the hearing as provided in part 
A of section (5). 
The hearing procedure of the Model Act is identical to that of Rule 
76a220 with one exception. Unlike Rule 76a,221 the Model Act does 
not require payment of a fee to file a plea of intervention. If the 
notice procedure's purpose is to provide interested parties with the 
opportunity to intervene on behalf of the public good, then there 
should be no obstacles preventing access to the hearing process. 
Restricting access to the hearing process to those who can pay a fee 
would risk suppressing information that may be of critical impor-
tance to public safety. If a party with little stake in the hearing's 
outcome but possessing relevant information regarding the sealing 
of specific court records is discouraged from participating in the 
hearing process because of an unwillingness or inability to pay a 
court fee, then the public interest will suffer. 
Antisecrecy legislation opponents argue that mandating a hearing 
process for motions to limit access to court records would flood the 
courts with a multitude of parties seeking to be heard on a particular 
motion to limit access. 222 Although this possibility does exist, nu-
merical data from hearings held under Rule 76a indicate that these 
hearings probably would be quick and sparsely attended affairs. 223 
Nevertheless, such hearings would provide the public with a voice 
in the limiting access process while at the same time contributing 
necessary factual information to allow the judiciary to make educated 
limiting access decisions. 
The Model Act also provides for temporary sealing and protective 
orders. Under the terms of the Model Act, a moving party would 
have the opportunity to obtain from a court a temporary order 
limiting access to specific documents and information before the court 
applied the initial in camera balancing test. Temporary sealing or 
protective orders would be issued by the court under the Model Act 
only upon a finding that immediate and irreparable injury would 
result to the party's privacy interests before the court held its formal 
220 See TEX. R. elV. P. ANN. r. 76a(4) (West Supp. 1991). 
221 [d. The provision states that "[nlon-parties may intervene as a matter of right for the 
limited purpose of participating in the proceedings, upon payment of the fee required for filing 
a plea of intervention. " [d. 
222 See Tuma, supra note 89, at 4. 
223 See Ballard, supra note 95, at 1. As of February 11, 1991 sealing requests were opposed 
in only 5 cases. [d. 
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in camera review. 224 Following this review process, the court could 
continue, modify or withdraw the temporary order pending hearing. 
The court automatically would withdraw the temporary order upon 
commencement of the hearing. 
Section 6(B) of the Model Act, which differs substantially from 
that in Rule 76a,225 would protect sensitive information from a plain-
tiffs' possible bad faith attempt at disclosure. Unlike Rule 76a's 
requirement,226 the Model Act's in camera review requirement 
would eliminate the need to allow a party or intervenor to seek 
judicial dissolution or modification of a temporary order. The in 
camera review would be a one-sided judicial evaluation with only 
the movant's arguments under consideration. The use of the balanc-
ing test, however, combined with the earliest possible hearing date, 
should safeguard the public from the concealment of hazardous in-
formation and, at worst, would result in only a short delay until 
disclosure. 
7) Order on Motion to Limit Access. A motion to limit access 
shall be decided by written order that rules solely on the motion 
and states the specific reasons for finding whether or not the 
standards required in section (3)(A) have been met. The written 
order shall state a) the style and number of the case, b) the time 
and place the public hearing was held, c) the identity of the 
movant including names, addresses, and phone numbers of the 
attorneys for the parties in the civil action, d) a brief, specific 
description of the nature of the case and the information or 
documents that movant requests be withheld from access, e) all 
parties and nonparties that participated in the hearing, f) the 
specific reasons for finding and concluding whether the showing 
required by section (3) has been made, g) and the information 
or documents to which an order limiting access applies, who is 
denied access, and the time period that access is denied. The 
order shall not be included in any judgment or other order but 
shall be a separate document in the case; however, failure to 
comply with this requirement shall not affect its appealability. 
A copy of the order shall be filed with the clerk of the court for 
inclusion in the files created under section (5)(e), and with the 
applicable United States Attorney General's office. 
The Model Act is designed to ensure that written findings, dem-
onstrating whether a particular motion to limit access meets the 
balancing test requirements are thorough and informative. In an 
224 See also TEX. R. Cry. P. ANN. r. 76a(5) (West Supp. 1991); supra note 126 and accom-
panying text. 
225 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
226 See Doggett, supra note 86, at 63-64. 
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effort to avoid blanket decisions limiting access to entire files, this 
provision requires specificity as to the documentation an order lim-
iting access covers and the duration of the order. 227 The specific 
written reasons for the finding would serve as a reference, and in 
turn a deterrent, to similar attempts at limiting access. Inclusion of 
these orders in the files of the clerk of the court would provide any 
party with the opportunity to research the history of a particular 
motion's success. 
8) Appeal of Order on Motion to Limit Access. Any order or 
portion of an order ruling on a motion to limit access or any 
other request to limit access to information or documents re-
ferred to in section (3) shall be appealable by any party or 
intervenor who participated in the hearing preceding issuance of 
such order. The appellate court may, in light of section (3) re-
quirements, reverse the order, or abate the appeal and order 
the trial court to direct that further public notice be given, or to 
hold further hearings, or to make additional findings. 
The Model Act provides an appeal standard virtually identical to 
Rule 76a's appeal standard. 228 As in Rule 76a, the Model Act would 
allow an appellate court to abate an appeal and order the trial court 
to adhere to the standards and procedures of this legislation. 229 The 
Model Act provides expansive appellate power in an effort to impress 
upon the judiciary the requirement of strict compliance to the bal-
ancing test provisions of this legislation. 230 All parties and nonparties 
that participated in the limiting access hearing would be recorded 
by the court clerk to create a list of those parties eligible to appeal 
a decision. 
9) Continuing Jurisdiction. A court that enters an order under 
this section limiting access to court records retains continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate the order. Any person 
may bring a motion to enforce, alter, or vacate that order, subject 
to this section. An order shall not be reconsidered on motion of 
any party or intervenor who had actual notice of the hearing 
preceding issuance of the order, or who subsequently challenged 
the order, unless the party or intervenor shows that circum-
stances materially affecting the order have changed. Such cir-
cumstances need not be related to the case in which the order 
was issued. No order limiting access shall remain in effect unless 
227 I d. at 64. 
228 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
229 See Doggett, supra note 86, at 64. 
230 See id. 
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the standards in section (3) are met at the time when the order 
is challenged or reconsidered. 
411 
The Model Act would allow a court to retain continuing jurisdiction 
in order to entertain challenges to orders limiting access to infor-
mation and documentation.231 Any person, except one who had actual 
notice of the original hearing or subsequently challenged the order, 
would have the opportunity to ask the court to enforce, alter, or 
vacate the order.232 If a party or nonparty that originally participated 
in the hearing or subsequently challenged the order acquires new 
information that materially affects the order's validity, that party 
would receive standing to challenge the order again. Any other 
scenario that gives standing to a party who already challenged the 
order would be repetitious and a waste of the court's time. 
Opponents of such a continuing jurisdiction provision fear that an 
indefinite series of pretrial and post-judgement challenges and hear-
ings would result from relaxed standing requirements to challenge 
an order.233 This prospect is not encouraging in the face of the already 
overflowing court dockets. Judges Hecht and Gonzalez, the two 
Texas Supreme Court justices who dissented to Rule 76a's pas-
sage,234 found the notice and continuing jurisdiction provisions of the 
rule especially troubling. According to Hecht and Gonzalez, these 
provisions allow anyone to challenge a sealing motion or order so 
long as that person did not have actual notice of the hearing preced-
ing issuance of the order.235 Justice Hecht is unclear regarding how 
movants can prevent a continuous flow of challenges to a sealing 
order without giving notice to the whole world.236 It therefore ap-
pears that a party can never be assured that the court record is 
permanently protected under Rule 76a.237 
A sealing order's lack of permanence under Rule 76a is a benefit, 
not a downfall, of the court rule. The continuing jurisdiction provi-
sion of Rule 76a, and the Model Act, ensures that no order limiting 
231 See TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(7) (West Supp. 1991); supra notes 129-83 and accom-
panying text. 
232 Cf TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(7) (West Supp. 1991). 
233 See Tuma, supra note 89, at 4. 
234 See TEX. RULES OF COURT, Concurring and Dissenting Statement 2 (Gonzalez & Hecht, 
JJ.) (West Supp. 1990). 
235 See id. at 4. 
236 [d. Intervenors who did not have "actual notice" of the previous motion to seal may force 
reconsideration of the order. See TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(7) (West Supp. 1991). It does 
not matter if this challenge is identical to a challenge the court previously denied. See Tuma, 
supra note 89, at 4. 
237 See Tuma, supra note 89, at 4. 
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access will remain in effect unless it continuously meets the balancing 
test requirements. 238 It is unlikely that a particular order limiting 
access will face a continuous stream of frivolous challenges. 239 The 
real possibility exists that technology, public awareness, and edu-
cation about environmental, product, and other hazards will advance, 
leading to the development of new information that may render a 
previous order to limit access void for public health and safety rea-
sons. For example, chemicals or designs deemed harmless today 
may someday be classified as public hazards. Information about this 
newly discovered public hazard's past uses and distribution will be-
come extremely relevant to past and future judicial decisions to limit 
access to court record information. 
(10) Return and Destruction of Documents. No court may enter 
an order requiring any litigant, attorney, government official, or 
member of the public to return or destroy any legally obtained 
information or document referred to in section (2). 
The amount of time a party is required to maintain documents 
under Rule 76a is not clear.240 If Rule 76a required parties to file all 
case documentation with a court for storage, then there would 
quickly develop the costly need to build court storage warehouses 
all over the country. On the other hand, forcing parties to retain 
documents carries with it the risks of spoilation.241 Rule 76a, and the 
Model Act, leave the decision to retain documents to the good faith 
judgment of the parties.242 Under the Model Act, parties are re-
sponsible for retaining documents in a manner generally regarded 
as proper given the type of document and the nature of the case. 243 
This provision of the Model Act also seeks to augment the parties' 
responsibility to retain documents in good faith by forbidding a court 
238 See TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 76a(7) (West Supp. 1991). 
239 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 681. Justice Doggett believes that the 
continuing jurisdiction provision will not tax the already burdened court system. [d. First, 
few cases will gain the public attention that would result in repeated attempts to alter an 
order. [d. Second, by involving members of the local media or other non parties who may 
develop a future interest in the matter of the original hearing, the movant reduces the 
likelihood of relitigation of the order. [d. Third, a party who had actual notice of the original 
hearing will not be given standing to challenge a sealing order without showing a change in 
circumstances that materially affect the order. [d. at 681-82. 
240 See Herring, supra note 108, at 24. Defense attorneys fear having to keep documents 
forever under Rule 76a's ambiguous guidelines. [d. 
241 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990). Spoilation is defined as the destruction 
or significant alteration of a document or instrument. [d. 
242 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
243 See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 57, at 664. 
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to sanction either the return of discovery materials to their original 
parties or the destruction of documents. 244 
(11) Agreements and Orders to the Contrary are Void. Any 
portion of any agreement, contract, stipulation, or court order 
that is contrary to the provisions of this section are void, con-
trary to public policy, and may not be enforced. 
Unlike Rule 76a, the Model Act would not castigate attempts to 
withhold injurious information to the public by merely disclosing the 
documentation, while at the same time sanctioning those agree-
ments.245 As a matter of public policy, the Model Act deems void 
and unenforceable any agreement, contract, stipulation, or court 
order that is counter to its letter and/or spirit. The net effect of this 
provision would be to expand the judiciary's role to affect those 
agreements reached outside the courtroom which conceal public haz-
ards. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The current process for reviewing a movant's "good cause" for the 
issuance of a protective order under FRCP 26(c) is ineffective. Public 
health and safety are not priorities in judicial decision-making re-
garding the limiting of public access to court records. As a result, 
information concerning public hazards is locked away in courthouse 
files. 
A federal antisecrecy law is needed so that "hush money" settle-
ments are no longer legitimized through court-approved confiden-
tiality stipulations, and plaintiffs are no longer forced to choose 
between personal and public interests. 
The time has come to enact a federal antisecrecy law that estab-
lishes a specific procedure to which judges must adhere when decid-
ing to limit public access to court records. The proposed Model Act 
in this Comment suggests that this procedure should entail a hearing 
process similar to that in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a, with 
an emphasis on restricting the concealment of public hazard infor-
mation as in Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act. Access to public 
court records should only be limited upon judicial determination that 
244 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
245 See TEX. R. elV. P. ANN. r. 76a(West Supp. 1991). Rule 76a attempts to avoid the 
sealing of documentation of agreements that may have an adverse affect upon the general 
health and safety of the public. Yet the Rule falls short of automatically rendering the harmful 
agreement void, contrary to public policy, and unenforceable. [d. 
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the records in question do not conceal public hazard information, and 
upon a movant's showing of a specific, serious, and substantial pri-
vacy interest that can not be protected short of limiting access. 
Overall, antisecrecy legislation will provide the public with access 
to information that can be used to foster change and work to safe-
guard the world in which we live. 
